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INTRODUCTION
Adjudicative tribunals are given statutory authority to provide
parties with remedies in order to fulfill statutory purposes. How do we
know, however, whether the remedies ordered by a tribunal actually do
advance those purposes? In other words, how can the success of an
adjudicative tribunal be subject to meaningful empirical validation? That
is the question we explore in this brief study. It is likely that this
question, while broad in theory, can only be addressed by looking to the
practice of a particular board or boards, in the context of a particular
statute or statutes. This study takes as its case study the role of
adjudicative tribunals in the health system in Ontario.
Adjudicative tribunals play an important role in the health sector,
yet their actual influence as part of the health system remains largely
unknown.1 Most evaluations of their work have focused on internal
measures of accountability and independence rather than external
indicators of societal impact. When their effectiveness is examined,
assessors tend to utilize anecdotes from various experts and stakeholders
rather than the rigorous empirical data that is almost certainly better suited
for the purpose.
As efforts to reform health systems continue
internationally, it will be increasingly important to truly understand the
benefits, costs and implications of adjudicative tribunals for providers and
consumers of health care services as well as the institutional structures on
1

Adjudicative tribunals may be defined in a number of ways. This category could
include: (1) any administrative body engaged in adjudication, including regulatory
bodies whose principle function is policymaking but who also engage in adjudication;
(2) both administrative and judicial bodies which engage in adjudication; or (3) only
those bodies whose primary or only function is adjudication. We adopt the latter
interpretation, but rely on studies and empirical approaches drawn from the regulatory
and judicial environment as well, with necessary adaptation to the sphere of
administrative bodies whose primary statutory function is adjudication. Ron Ellis, for
example, has identified 27 of such tribunals in the Province of Ontario in Canada
which engage in “rights adjudication”: R. Ellis, Executive Branch Justice: Canada’s
‘Official Courts,’ (Ph.D. Dissertation. York University, 2009), at p. 77.
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which they rely. The dynamic, independent and powerful oversight
mechanism of administrative bodies, and their dispute resolution
potential, may only be realized with further information on the ways in
which they interact with the rest of the complex health system and the
impact they have within it. A strong and accountable health system may
depend upon it.
In this context, empirical evaluations are an opportunity to inform
health policymaking through the collection of objective data regarding the
impact of adjudicative tribunals on the health system. Empirical research
includes quantitative and qualitative investigations on the effects of
enacted or proposed interventions—including laws, regulations and
policies—on economic, social or health outcomes.
It may be
distinguished from other types of research by its reliance on data and its
use of the scientific method of inquiry.2 Empirical study designs range
from experimental (e.g., randomized controlled trials) to quasiexperimental (e.g., interrupted time-series studies) to observational (e.g.,
cohort, case-control and cross-sectional studies), with data often gathered
from surveys, interviews, focus groups, statistical inventories,
performance data or documentary analyses.
Empirical research, however, is not new to the health or legal
spheres. For health, experimentation, observation and the scientific
method have all been at its core for over a hundred years, with modern
“evidence-based medicine”3 even going as far as prioritizing the
“conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in
making decisions about the care of individual patients” over all other
possible inputs.4 In the legal arena, empirical research has also started to
expand both in general5 and for health-related studies specifically.6
2

3

4

5

6

M.M. Mello and K. Zeiler. “Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The State of the
Field” (2008), 96 Georgetown Law Journal 649.
Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, “Evidence-Based Medicine: A New
Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine” (1992), 268 Journal of the American
Medical Association 2420.
D.L. Sackett, W.M Rosenberg, J.A. Gray, R.B. Haynes, and W.S. Richardson.
“Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t” (1996), 312(7023) British
Medical Journal 71, online: British Medical Journal <http://www.bmj.com/cgi/
content/full/312/7023/71> (accessed 8 January 2009).
T.E. George, “An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law
Schools” (2006), 81(1) Indiana Law Journal 141, online: Indiana University Maurer
School of Law, <http://www.law.indiana.edu/ilj/volumes/v81/no1/8_George.pdf>
(accessed 15 January 2009).
Supra note 2.
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However, when compared to the health sphere, it is clear that empirical
methodologies in studies of legal institutions have been relatively
underutilized. This can perhaps be explained by the complexity of legal
interventions, the dearth of large-scale accessible data sets upon which to
rely, and the heterogeneity of legal interventions which prevent natural
experiments of cross-jurisdictional comparisons.7
In addition to these general challenges faced by all empirical legal
researchers, any attempt to evaluate the impact of a health-related
adjudicative tribunal faces additional hurdles. Not only has such an
assessment never before been comprehensively undertaken, but the most
suitable research methodology to do so remains highly elusive. Much of
empirical health research, for example, relates to patient outcomes and the
costs associated with achieving these outcomes. In the setting of
adjudicative tribunals, these metrics may not apply. A proceeding before
a health tribunal may take place after the outcome for the patient already
has occurred, and for this reason the tribunals in fact may impose
additional costs on the health system without directly yielding improved
health outcomes. While those additional costs may well lead to better
practices and procedures on the part of other actors in the health system
(e.g., regulatory colleges, insurance plans, hospitals), this type of benefit
is indirect, may only become apparent over time, and is inherently
difficult to measure.
Distinctions in statutory mandate and the absence of clear
statutory language setting out the purposes of adjudicative tribunals leave
no final target outcomes against which services can be evaluated. Further,
as creatures of statue that serve quasi-judicial functions, adjudicative
tribunals sit at the intersection of the legal and health worlds. These
tribunals operate within these two paradigms—a dichotomy of process
and outcomes—whose goals may sometimes diverge.
Indeed, these
administrative bodies are expected to preserve the legal focus on process,
fairness and individual-level dispute resolution while at the same time
working to improve health-related outcomes by enhancing the overall
effectiveness of the health system.8 The tension between a process- and a
7
8

Ibid.
While this process-outcomes dichotomy between the legal and health worlds is
certainly evident when comparing their respective research literature, it is important
to recognize that both types of work are conducted within both realms. Mello and
Zeiler (2008), for example, highlight several socio-legal studies that gathered
outcome-related data, and health researchers frequently address questions of ethics
and resource allocation that are more procedural in nature.
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substance-based mandate presents distinct challenges for empirical
evaluation, especially as evaluations of either dimension would be
difficult. The complex co-dependence and interconnectedness of these
tribunals with the health system’s constituent elements ensure that simple
appraisal techniques cannot be effectively utilized. To the extent that
adjudicative tribunals have an impact on the health system, it is likely to
be linked to a host of other variables. The fact that evaluation is not easy,
however, does not detract from its importance.
The absence of any comprehensive empirical evaluations on the
impact of adjudicative tribunals, and the potentially significant benefits of
undertaking such an evaluation, certainly provide sufficient justification
for further exploring this possibility. Empirical research, for example, is
the only way to accurately assess the population’s needs, capture
stakeholders’ perceptions, test the effectiveness of new initiatives, and
verify improvements over time. It can help identify areas of strength and
weakness, point to opportunities for growth or improvement, and facilitate
a continual process of enhancements so as to better serve the tribunals’
constituents and strengthen the health system.
Despite these benefits and recognized importance, the evaluation
and accountability of adjudicative tribunals is also one of the least
scrutinized areas of administrative law. The topic necessarily engages the
issue of administrative independence, the statutory environment within
which all adjudicative tribunals operate, the policy priorities of
government which funds tribunals, the complexity of the health system,
and the role of the court in supervising health-related adjudicative
tribunals through the mechanisms of judicial review. Evaluating impact
in the health sector is also necessarily a contextual exercise. As Peter
Cane observed in the administrative law context:
[T]he impact of judicial review needs to be studied in a
contextualised way by reference to judicial review’s objectives and
functions. Also, it should not be assumed that, when we discuss the
impact of judicial review, we are all talking about impact of the
same thing or, at least, of a single institution with a single set of
objectives and functions.9
9

P. Cane, “Understanding Judicial Review and its Impact” in M. Hertogh and S.
Halliday eds., Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
at pp. 15–42. See also M. Sunkin, “Conceptual Issues in Researching the Impact of
Judicial Review on Government Bureaucracies” in the same volume at pp. 43–75.
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A similar approach is necessary for health-related adjudicative tribunals
but has never been systematically followed.
This paper aims to explore the context, challenges and
opportunities for empirically evaluating the impact of adjudicative
tribunals in the health sector. First, we will discuss the purpose, function
and importance of these bodies within the health system, including their
statutory mandates and policy goals. Second, we will examine the various
ways in which their performance could potentially be assessed and will
justify why there is a need to develop empirical approaches for the
assessment of adjudicative decision-making. Third, we will identify the
extensive barriers to empirically evaluating the societal impact of
adjudicative tribunals, which we situate in three distinct categories: (1)
complexity of the health system; (2) methodological complications; and
(3) realities of the legal profession and the environment in which it
currently operates. Finally, based on this analysis, we will advance what
we believe to be the most constructive path forward for the empirical
assessment of adjudicative decision-making. We hope that this work will
encourage and inform future empirical evaluations of adjudicative
tribunals in the health sector that will help to improve their performance,
enhance health decision-making, advance patient safety goals and
facilitate the achievement of population health goals.
The focus of this analysis is on Ontario’s two adjudicative health
tribunals in Canada, the Ontario Health Professions Appeals and Review
Board (“HPARB”)10 and the Health Services Appeals and Review Board
(“HSARB”). Both HPARB and HSARB have statutory mandates to
review important health decisions that intimately affect the lives of their
constituents. Using these two bodies as case studies for exploring the
context, challenges and opportunities for evaluating adjudicative tribunals
may enrich our understanding of administrative tribunals throughout other
sectors as well.

10

Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, Recommendations to Health
Professions Regulatory Advisory Council (Toronto: Health Professions Appeal and
Review Board, 2008), online: Health Professions Appeal and Review Board,
<http://www.hprac.org/en/projects/resources/hprac-1457May30HPARB.pdf>
(accessed 28 March 2009).
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THE CONTEXT
SECTOR

OF

ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS

IN THE

HEALTH

Adjudicative tribunals are administrative bodies that are created
by statutes and exercise delegated decision-making powers of the
executive branch for the purposes of achieving certain policy goals. They
serve as an oversight mechanism for lower-level decision-makers and
apply legal and normative principles to resolve disputes between
conflicting parties. They are independent—operating at arm’s-length
from the government—and serve quasi-judicial functions otherwise
fulfilled by the formal judicial system. This independence, however, also
has limits; their members are appointed by the executive branch of
government (in the case of HPARB and HSARB, the power of
appointment is effectively in the hands of the Minister of Health) which
also sets their staffing allowances and budgets. Their decisions, while
often final, must be authorized by their enabling statute and are subject to
judicial review by the courts. Governments pursue policies in relation to
these bodies for a host of reasons. The government may, for example,
wish to remove the need for court intervention, facilitate opportunities for
settlement, enhance access to efficient and effective dispute resolution
mechanisms, or promote fairness.
In the health sector, adjudicative tribunals may be involved with
resolving disputes regarding medical malpractice claims, insurance
coverage for health care services, determination of mental capacity,
licensing decisions for health care facilities, and patient safety procedures.
They serve as an oversight and accountability mechanism for lower-level
health decision-makers and ensure they follow appropriate processes and
act according to their respective statutory mandates. They aim to boost
public confidence in the credibility of decision-making within the health
system, facilitate better and more consistent decisions, and reduce the risk
of errors that in this context can have deadly consequences. Finally, they
promote fairness and justice within health care, militate against selfinterest and corruption, and provide opportunities to address wrongs
through redress.
HPARB, for example, is an integral part of Ontario’s selfregulating health professional system. It helps to ensure that the health
professions are regulated in the public interest, that appropriate standards
of practice are created and maintained, that patients have access to the
health professional of their choice, and that they are treated with respect
and sensitivity by health professionals. HPARB was established as a
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response to two related phenomena in the early 1970s: first, the
recommendation arising out of the Report by the Honourable James
Chalmers McRuer’s Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (the
“McRuer Report”) which emphasized the need for public interest
oversight over self-regulating professional bodies; and second, the
Committee on the Healing Arts tabled by the government on April 28,
1970 (the “Healing Arts Report”), which also emphasized the primacy of
public interest regulation of health professionals. Under the Province of
Ontario’s Regulated Health Professions Act (“RHPA”), people may
appeal the decision of a self-regulated health professional college to not
pursue a disciplinary proceeding to HPARB.11 If the appropriate statutory
processes were not followed by the relevant college, the Board is
empowered to send the matter back to the college for reconsideration.
HPARB also hears appeals from adverse decisions by the colleges in
relation to registration requests. The remedies available to HPARB
panels focus on the regulated colleges, as opposed to the parties. For
example, if a complaint was dismissed and an HPARB panel finds that the
investigation was inadequate or the decision to dismiss the complaint was
unreasonable, the complaint usually will be sent back to the college to
reconsider its reasons or investigate the complaint further.
Recommendations to the college may also be provided where the issues
raised on a complaint review are more systemic. Parties, however, are not
entitled to damages, or to an apology, or to any other individual remedy
they may seek or to which they may feel entitled. For this reason, it is not
uncommon to find parties who both seek a complaint review from
HPARB and simultaneously pursue civil remedies against health
professionals or health facilities arising from the same factual
circumstances.
HSARB similarly is a part-time Board providing oversight for the
decisions of various actors within the health system. Its broad jurisdiction
arises from fourteen different statutes and includes reviewing decisions
concerning payment for health care services under the Ontario Health
Insurance Plan (“OHIP”), eligibility for housing in long-term care
facilities, licensing of nursing homes and other independent health

11

Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18, s. 3. Also see R.
Steinecke, A Complete Guide to the Regulated Health Professions Act. (Toronto:
Canada Law Book, Looseleaf). The RHPA is one of several statutes administered by
HPARB.
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facilities, and the decisions of public health officials.12 By contrast,
HSARB provides individual remedies, ordering, for example, that OHIP
fund out-of-country medical services where the statutory test is met.
Both HPARB and HSARB have a full-time Chair,13 and a roster of
part-time members, some of whom have legal training (and, in the case of
HSARB, medical training) and some who do not. Both Boards have been
held to be expert bodies by reviewing Courts which warrant deference.
Their substantive decisions may only be overturned if found to be
“unreasonable.”14
As indicated above, a key aspect of evaluating tribunals created by
statute is to assess whether a tribunal is fulfilling its statutory objective(s).
This may be especially challenging, for example, if the specific goals of
the relevant tribunal are diffuse and ambiguous in their enabling
legislation. Ontario’s RHPA, for example, does not detail the purposes of
the Board, so this must be inferred from the powers and authority with
which it has been provided. For example, as indicated above, HPARB
has the power to review decisions of regulated health colleges not to refer
complaints to a full hearing to determine if a health professional has
engaged in misconduct warranting discipline on grounds of the
reasonableness of the college’s decision and the adequacy of the college’s
investigation.15 HPARB has broader jurisdiction to review decisions by
colleges to deny registration to applicants.16 Thus, while HPARB’s role is
generally to ensure public interest accountability over decision-making by
regulated health colleges, HPARB’s role in reviewing complaints
suggests a different purpose, and a more deferential standard of review,
than its role in reviewing denials of registration. Evaluation needs to be
responsive to these differences of statutory mandate and remedial
discretion.

12

13
14

15
16

C. Pitfield and C.M. Flood, “Section 7 ‘Safety Valves’: Appealing Wait Times Within
a One-Tier System” in C.M. Flood, K. Roach and L.Sossin eds., Access to Care,
Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada,
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), at pp. 477–501.
Since 2008, the same individual has served as Chair of both Boards.
See, with respect to HPARB, Botros v. Beadle (2007), 228 O.A.C. 75, and with
respect to HSARB, Flora v. Ontario (Health Insurance Plan, General Manager)
(2008), 91 O.R. (3d) 412.
See s. 29(2) of the Health Professions Procedure Code, Schedule 2 to the RHPA.
See s. 22(1) of the Health Professions Procedure Code, Schedule 2 to the RHPA.
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THE CONTEXT FOR EVALUATING ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS

Assessing the work of these adjudicative tribunals and others in
the health sector is an inherently complex enterprise. However,
evaluations can be thought of and categorized according to their
orientation and methodology.
In terms of orientation, evaluations of tribunals can be focused on
how they function or what impact they have. The former would analyze
the internal operations of a tribunal while the latter would assess the
body’s external effects on a specified population. Procedural analyses are
important to promote coherent internal management structures, good
governance, accountability, efficiency and efficacy. External impact
evaluations, on the other hand, represent a way to assess the real-world
effectiveness of the adjudicative tribunal, its impact on others within the
health care system, and the benefits (or consequences) that this impact
yields. Such studies can determine whether or not these bodies support
and/or enhance the functioning of various health system institutions and
decision-makers and whether or not they ultimately influence service
provision, access to justice in the health sector, and health outcomes.
External impact evaluations require expertise and independence—they are
not traditionally conducted by auditors,17 ombudsmen18 or internal staff.19
A review of several purposively sampled governmental
evaluations of administrative bodies highlights very clearly that they tend
to focus on issues related to internal operations rather than external
impact. The recent report of the Ontario Security Commission’s Fairness
Committee, for example, examined whether the agency’s internal
governance structure created a perception or reality of bias in its
adjudicative responsibilities.20 The United Kingdom’s National Audit
17

18

19

20

J. McCarter, Annual Report 2008: Office of the Auditor-General, (Toronto: Queen’s
Printer for Ontario, 2008), online: Office of the Auditor General
<http://www.auditor.on.ca/en/reports_en/en08/ar_en08.pdf> (accessed 22 June 2009).
A. Marin, Ombudsman Ontario: Annual Report 2007–2008, (Toronto: Office of the
Ombudsman, 2008), online: Office of the Ombudsman, <http://www.ombudsman.
on.ca/media/18971/ar08_eng.pdf> (accessed 22 June 2009).
Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council, HPRAC: Annual Report April 1,
2007 – March 31, 2008, (Toronto: Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council,
2008), online: Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council http://www.
hprac.org/en/reports/resources/HPRACAnnualReport2007-2008.pdf.
C.A. Osborne, D.J. Mullan and B. Finlay, Report of the Fairness Committee to David
A. Brown, Q.C., Chair of the Ontario Securities Commission, (Toronto: Ontario
Securities Commission, 2004).
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Office similarly reviewed the procedures used by its Department of Work
and Pensions to medically assess incapacity and disability21 and to hear
appeals of social security benefit decisions.22 Some reviews examine
particular problems that had previously been identified23 while others
focus on users’ satisfaction with a tribunal’s provision of services.24
Several assessment efforts have even focused on the internal operations of
multiple tribunals or a jurisdiction’s entire tribunal system, including the
report of Ontario’s Agency Reform Commission,25 the UK’s Leggatt
21

22

23

24

25

National Audit Office, Progress in Improving the Medical Assessment of Incapacity
and Disability Benefits: Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. HC 1141,
Session 2002-2003, 17/10/2003, (London: Stationery Office, 2003), online: National
Audit Office <http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/02-03/02031141.pdf>
(accessed 12 March 2009).
National Audit Office, Getting It Right, Putting It Right: Improving Decision-Making
and Appeals in Social Security Benefits. HC 1142, Session 2002-2003, 07/11/2003,
(London: Stationery Office, 2003), online: National Audit Office <http://www.nao.
org.uk/publications/nao_reports/02-03/02031142.pdf> (accessed 12 March 2009).
See, for example, Society of Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators, Towards
Maintaining and Improving the Quality of Adjudication: SOAR Recommendations for
Performance Management in Ontario’s Administrative Justice Tribunals, (Toronto:
Society of Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators, 1995), online: Society of Ontario
Adjudicators and Regulators <http://www.soar.on.ca/soar-perf_man.htm> (accessed
12 March 2009); S. Blumenthal and S. Wessely. The Pattern of Delays in Mental
Health Review Tribunals, (London: Stationery Office, 1993); S. Blumenthal and S.
Wessely. “The Pattern of Delays in Mental Health Review Tribunals” (1994), 18(7)
Psychiatric Bulletin 398, online: Psychiatric Bulletin <http://pb.rcpsych.org/cgi/
reprint/18/7/398.pdf> (accessed 12 March 2009).
See, for example J. Aston, D. Hill and N.D. Tackey, The Experience of Claimants in
Race Discrimination Employment Tribunal Cases. Employment Relations Research
Series, No. 55, (London: UK Department of Trade and Industry, 2006), online: UK
Department of Trade and Industry <http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file27818.pdf>
(accessed 12 March 2009); Employment Tribunals Service, Employment Tribunals
Service User Survey 2005, (London: Employment Tribunals Service, 2005);
Confederation of British Industry, A Matter of Confidence: Restoring Faith in
Employment Tribunals, (London: Confederation of British Industry, 2005), online:
Confederation of British Industry <http://www.cbi.org.uk/ndbs/Press.nsf/0/
33f9830ed75f765b8025708800523621/$FILE/Tribunals Brief - CBI.pdf> (accessed
12 March 2009); M.P. Carscallen, W.K. Gray and J.G. Pink, Regulatory Burden Task
Force: Report to the Ontario Securities Commission, (Toronto: Ontario Securities
Commission, 2003), online: Ontario Securities Commission <http://www.osc.gov.
on.ca/About/Governance/Accountability/ga_20031212_rbtf-rpt.pdf> (accessed 12
March 2009).
G. Guzzo, J. Baird, B. Grimmett, G. Martiniuk and J. Flaherty, Everyday Justice:
Report of the Agency Reform Commission on Ontario’s Regulatory and Adjudicative
Agencies, (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 1998), online: Council of Canadian
Administrative Tribunals <http://www.ccat-ctac.org/downloads/1998_Guzzo-report.
pdf> (accessed 12 March 2009).
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Review of Tribunals,26 and the report of the UK’s former Council on
Tribunals.27 Academic publications similarly appear to focus on the
internal operations of tribunals across various topics—whether they
regulate securities,28 medical malpractice claims,29 privacy,30 pensions,31
or determinations of medical incapacity—32 and often examine users’
experience.33 While not a single governmental evaluation could be found
26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

A. Leggatt, Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service, (London: UK Department
for Constitutional Affairs, 2001), online: Review of Tribunals <http://www.tribunalsreview.org.uk/index.htm> (accessed 12 March 2009).
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that focused on the external impact of adjudicative tribunals, at least one
academic publication discusses the potential benefits that administrative
“health courts” (which resolve malpractice claims) can have on patient
safety.34
In terms of methodology, assessments of tribunals can either be
conducted through expert reviews or empirical evaluations. The first
approach would take advantage of the personal experiences and
perspective of an investigator, while the second approach harnesses the
objectivity of the scientific method and the generalizability of data that
was collected from many people. Expert reviews rely upon the contextual
and reflective expertise of the authors and are important for probing the
etiology of complex challenges within the tribunal system, raising
questions of possible concern or future inquiry, indentifying structural
problems and possible ways to overcome them, justifying political
decisions (either from the past or those planned for the future), and
suggesting palatable recommendations for reform. This approach is also
more likely to have fewer costs and a faster completion timeline.
Empirical evaluations of tribunals, by contrast, utilize scientific methods
and can be used to, inter alia, quantitatively or qualitatively assess their
impact on the health system, identify the factors that determine their
successful operations, and track perceptions of them over time. It is
important to note, however, that these two methodological approaches
cannot in reality be strictly dichotomized, as experts often utilize
empirical methods and even the most scientifically rigorous and objective
evaluations must be interpreted by individuals—who are preferably
experts in their field.
Reviews of adjudicative tribunals have been conducted using both
expert and empirical methodologies. Prominent observers, academics and
practitioners, for example, have assessed various tribunals’ organizational
structures,35 efficiency,36 accessibility,37 independence,38 performance
standards39 and overall effectiveness.40 Other reviews feature empirical
34
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elements such as: (1) surveys that capture the perceived quality of
services offered,41 stakeholder attitudes towards the tribunal,42 and the
functioning of a certain process;43 (2) interviews that probe users’
experiences with the tribunal,44 its perceived impartiality,45 and the
effectiveness of a particular procedure;46 and (3) performance data and
documentary analyses for examining key features of a tribunal’s
caseload47 and arrangements for how it makes appeal decisions.48
The challenge in evaluating health-related adjudicative tribunals,
therefore, seems to lie at the intersection of orientation and methodology.
Assessments of adjudicative tribunals have focused on both process and
impact, and have been conducted using both expert reviews and empirical
methods, yet not a single review could be found that empirically
evaluated the external impact of an adjudicative tribunal, despite
extensive searching. While this lack of research may indicate that such
undertakings are not important, interesting or possible, the evidence
suggests otherwise: the need for external impact evaluations is evident49
41
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43

44
45
46
47

48
49

Supra note 28.
Supra note 29.
P.L. Latreille, J.A. Latreille and K.G. Knight, Findings from the 1998 Survey of
Representatives in Employment Tribunal Cases. Employment Relations Research
Series, No. 35, (London: UK Department of Trade and Industry, 2004), online: UK
Department of Trade and Industry <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file11453.pdf>
(accessed 12 March 2009); P.L. Latreille, J.A. Latreille and K.G. Knight, “Making a
Difference? Legal Representation in Employment Tribunal Cases: Evidence from a
Survey of Representatives” (2005), 34(4) Industrial Law Journal 308.
Supra note 27; Supra note 42.
Supra note 37.
Supra note 36; Supra note 22; Supra note 40.
B. Hayward, M. Peters, N. Rousseau and K. Seeds, Findings from the Survey of
Employment Tribunal Applications 2003. Employment Relations Research Series,
No. 33, (London: UK Department of Trade and Industry, 2004), online: UK
Department of Trade and Industry <http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file11455.pdf>
(accessed 12 March 2009).
Supra note 23; Supra note 41.
M. Hertogh and S. Halliday, eds., Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact:
International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004); Center for Global Development’s Evaluation Gap Working Group,
When Will We Ever Learn? Improving Lives Through Impact Evaluation,
(Washington DC: Center for Global Development, 2006), online: Center for Global
Development http://www.cgdev.org/files/7973_file_WillWeEverLearn.pdf (accessed
22 June 2009); World Bank, Conducting Quality Impact Evaluations under Budget,
Time and Data Constraints, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2006), online: World
Bank
<http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJava

536

REMEDIES / LES RECOURS ET LES MESURES DE REDRESSEMENT

and such evaluations have been conducted with success in related settings
that also involve the nexus of the health and law sectors and beyond.50
The dearth of externally-focused empirical evaluations is not only
a missed opportunity; it may also pose a significant risk. The lack of an
empirical rationale for the benefits of a tribunal may render it vulnerable
to opposition or simply to general cost-cutting initiatives. Without this
data, the Boards may lack the baseline measures needed to track changes
over time, evaluate the performance of decision-makers and staff, and
engage in longer-term strategic planning. In short, without empirical
knowledge, how can we be sure that adjudicative tribunals are serving the
public interest?
Indeed, it is widely accepted that data-driven strategies are more
likely to help decision-makers achieve their goals in a cost-effective way
than polices pursued in the absence of evidence.51 Information gathered
by health-related adjudicative tribunals like HPARB and HSARB through
empirical methods may be of particular interest to government officials as
it can demonstrate performance benchmarks and ensure public funds are
being invested and spent effectively. If reform is called for, empirical
data will be essential in identifying what needs to change. For academics,
it is an under-scrutinized sphere of administrative law and health systems
functioning that is both ripe for research and, potentially, reform.
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EMPIRICALLY EVALUATING ADJUDICATIVE

Yet despite the tremendous benefits, empirical impact evaluations
of adjudicative tribunals are not being conducted. This absence of
assessment efforts is most likely attributable to the various challenges
facing anyone who embarks on undertaking such a project. In the context
of health adjudicative tribunals, these obstacles can be divided into three
categories: (1) complexity in the health system; (2) methodological
complications; and (3) legal factors.

A.

CHALLENGES WITH COMPLEXITY IN THE HEALTH SYSTEM

Empirically evaluating the impact of any adjudicative tribunal is a
naturally difficult enterprise, as it requires the body’s various effects to be
isolated from the larger social context within which it operates. This is no
doubt complicated for tribunals in every sector because their activities are
usually only indirectly related to their existential goals. This challenge,
however, may be further exacerbated in the health context due to its
overwhelming complexity.
Indeed, health systems are increasingly being recognized as
complex adaptive systems that are multi-layered, non-linear and highly
sophisticated. They consist of countless sub-systems with immeasurable
independent actors, established policies, zealously guarded interests,
entrenched professional “silos” and divergent cultures that can all
influence each another and even alter their external environments. This
web of elements, and the unpredictable interactions among them, ensures
that conventional mechanistic or “cause-effect” conceptualizations of the
health system are inaccurate and oversimplifications of its complex
dynamics.52
While scientific knowledge has been greatly advanced by breaking
big questions into smaller ones that can be observed, analyzed and
understood through rational deduction, this process is severely limited
when the studied phenomenon or intervention is located within a system
whose constitutive parts are not independent, constant or predictable. The
fact that the health system exhibits characteristics of distributed control,
co-dependence and nesting of smaller systems within other larger systems
52
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further aggravates this challenge and makes it difficult to fully examine
adjudicative tribunals without reference to other actors and institutions
(such as adjudicators, staff, government policymakers, regulatory
colleges, relevant expert panels, the traditional court system and the
public). Isolating and attributing impact is further problematized by the
fact that health-related adjudicative tribunals serve diverse functions
according to various players within completely different contexts.53

B.

CHALLENGES WITH RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Yet in addition to the daunting barriers imposed by health system
complexity, there are further methodological barriers associated with such
an undertaking. The primary challenge, as highlighted above, is that
simple research designs cannot be used to isolate adjudicative tribunals
and elegantly locate cause-effect relationships between them and their
goals. But above and beyond the various explanations illuminated by the
complexity perspective is the fact that efforts of adjudicative tribunals are
only indirectly related to their goals. Indeed, health services themselves
only partially help meet their goal of improved health for people. Any
legal, regulatory or oversight “intervention” that serves to better structure
these services would be even further removed from their ultimate goals.
Empirical impact studies of such interventions must be expertly designed
to account for this complexity.
However, even if simple methods did exist to observe the
relationship between adjudicative tribunals and their goals, there is
currently a lack of clear evaluative criteria against which particular
adjudicative tribunals can be measured. This is because their goals are
not easily articulated and have thus not been defined with adequate
precision—if defined at all. Desired outcome measures are consequently
absent, which ensures that suitable quantitative and/or qualitative research
methodologies cannot be matched to them. This problem, however,
cannot simply be overcome by brainstorming possible goals of
adjudicative tribunals. Indeed, the existential purpose of these bodies
may change and evolve over time with new legislators, government
policymakers, adjudicators and tribunal staff who can each contribute
toward a shift in the focus and priority of their operations over time.
53
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Various community stakeholders may also perceive the role of a
particular adjudicative tribunal in their sector very differently depending
upon their own mandate, ideological perspective and unique vantage
point. While reference to a tribunal’s enabling statute may be informative
in crafting an outcome measure, it is not always decisive. In the case of
HPARB, legislative provisions suggest this body was created to ensure
effective regulation of the health professions in the public interest,54 yet
this goal is not easily quantifiable. Indeed, the ability to empirically
evaluate a complex intervention like a health-related adjudicative tribunal
depends upon having a desired outcome that is observable, measurable
and testable against a null hypothesis.
A desire to empirically “prove” cause-effect relationships between
adjudicative tribunals and a particular outcome is also complicated by the
impossibility of randomly allocating potential users of existing tribunals
into groups that either receive or do not receive their services.
Randomized controlled trials—the most rigorous of discrete empirical
evaluations—55 assess the effect of an intervention on a test population in
comparison to a theoretically identical population. This method,
however, requires a properly-constituted (i.e., randomized) and
adequately-sized (i.e., large) control group with both known and unknown
confounding factors evenly distributed between them in order to isolate
the impact of tribunal services and measure it against a benchmark. Nonrandomized retrospective evaluations comparing users of tribunals to nonusers (or the situation of the general public in jurisdictions with and
without comparable tribunals) may not be an ideal solution to this
challenge, as this creates a situation where user-status and outcomes are
measured at the same time. This prevents efforts to control for
confounding factors, which in turn extinguishes the possibility of making
causal determinations.56
A penultimate methodological challenge for conducting external
impact evaluations of health-related adjudicative tribunals is that there are
few examples of past efforts to emulate. As previously mentioned, many
empirical studies have examined the internal processes of tribunals, but
54
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none could be found that focused on their societal impact. This is
exacerbated by the dearth of obvious empirical data sets which can be
analyzed and from which potential evaluators can draw.57 Whereas
hospitals may be able to compare their patient population and its
outcomes to those from neighbouring hospitals, adjudicative tribunals are
not likely in a position to continually collect data about their past users
nor compare this information to existing data sets from the same region or
others.
Finally, the identity and background of the researcher(s)
evaluating the impact of an adjudicative tribunal must also be considered.
While the goal of empirical study is to avoid bias and ideological
assumptions, every researcher brings a particular matrix of perspective,
orientation, experience and values to their work. Insiders, for example,
may bring intuition and experiential judgment, while outsiders may bring
independence, fresh eyes and objectivity.

C.

LEGAL FACTORS

As institutions that function within both the health and legal
systems, health-related adjudicative tribunals must also overcome the
realities of the legal sector that may not be particularly nurturing for
empirical impact evaluations. For example, legal actors are often focused
more on achieving due process, transparency and good governance than
specific societal outcomes (like improved health status which is the goal
of direct clinical health care). Excellent process in the legal world is often
thought to be the most likely way to achieve the best outcome.
There is also a much greater concern for maintaining
independence and avoiding any apprehension of bias. Like impartiality,
independence is a common law right of procedural fairness enjoyed by
parties who come before administrative bodies in common law
jurisdictions (including Canada, United States, United Kingdom,
Australia and New Zealand). In Canada, independence for adjudicative
tribunals is based on the categories of judicial independence identified by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Valente v. The Queen (i.e., security of
tenure, financial independence and administrative independence over
adjudicative matters)58 and applied to administrative bodies in Canadian
57
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Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band—albeit in a more flexible and
contextually sensitive manner.59
Respecting this independence of adjudicative tribunals will
naturally influence the process and content of any evaluation in multiple
ways. For example, independence suggests that governments should
refrain from evaluating tribunals’ substantive decisions lest reasonable
observers reach the legally-problematic conclusion that tribunals may
adjust their decision-making to align with what the government of the day
perceives as “successful.” Similarly, it may also be difficult for a tribunal
to establish evaluative criteria or outcome measures for itself, as this
might lead a reasonable observer to conclude that the tribunal may pursue
these goals at the expense of fairness to the parties. This concern for
independence even questions the extent to which tribunals’ staff and
members can be directly involved in any evaluation for fear of influencing
or interfering with their services, which must remain neutral at all times.
Contrary to encouraging self-evaluation as is common within the health
sphere, the legal environment may actually discourage adjudicative
tribunals from assessing their own external impact, especially since such
undertakings are not explicitly part of their statutory mandates.60
Finally, as recently highlighted by the Nuffield Inquiry on
Empirical Legal Research, the legal academy also suffers from a dearth of
empirical competence and capacity to conduct such studies.61 While the
field of empirical health law scholarship has recently grown
exponentially,62 it is generally accepted that current capacity is inadequate
and that it may further diminish over time. Empirical legal methodologies
are also generally recognized as under-developed relative to doctrinal and
59
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theoretical methodologies.63 The pervasive culture of deference to
experts and authority must further diminish the perceived value of
objective empirical work and weaken any apparent need for more
rigorous research that is higher on the hierarchy of evidence.64 Again, the
focus on elements of process (e.g., bias and independence) rather than
impact (e.g., judicial decisions) as indicator of quality and performance
must also deter legal scholars from conducting work in this area such that
target outcomes are less likely to be assessed.

IV.

REASONS FOR OPTIMISM

However, despite the challenges faced by potential evaluators of
adjudicative tribunals, there is reason for optimism: each of the various
identified barriers can be overcome and have indeed been circumvented in
similar evaluations. For example, as previously mentioned, many
empirical evaluations have been conducted that focus on the internal
operations of these bodies. A major literature review in 2007 highlighted
much of the work that has been conducted and published in this area.65
Yet in addition to these studies, empirical evaluations have also been
undertaken to assess the external impact of similarly-functioning specialty
courts that operate within the judicial system. A systematic review of the
research evidence has even been conducted on the societal impact of at
least one type of these judicial organs.66
Indeed, methodologically, there may be much to learn from
external impact evaluations of specialist courts in the judicial sector. For
example, “drug courts” have been extensively evaluated in the United
States and in other jurisdictions regarding their ability to increase
treatment rates, lower criminal recidivism, and enhance cost-effectiveness
of prosecution.67 Domestic violence courts and community courts have
63
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similarly been assessed for compliance, cost-effectiveness, conviction
rates and public perception, and mental health courts have been
comprehensively examined for reducing criminal violence, enhancing
community safety, conserving fiscal resources and improving clinical
outcomes. However, it must be recognized that the context within which
these judicial bodies operate is very different from that of health-related
administrative tribunals. Not only are they part of the judiciary rather
than the executive branch of government, but their existential goals are
usually related to diverting complex or special cases from traditional
courtrooms rather than supporting the infrastructure of a completely
different system (like that of health). Empirically tracking desired
outcomes like cost-savings and reduced reoffending rates will naturally be
easier in this context when the intervention or service is more directly
related to its goal. Yet, alternatively, it may actually be more difficult for
these judicial organs to evaluate themselves due to their strict separation
from the executive (which has the financial resources to fund such an
undertaking) and the likelihood that they will zealously guard their
independence.
The possible range of empirical legal research methodologies that
can be used in evaluating health-related adjudicative tribunals may benefit
from earlier studies. For example, Mello and Zeiler describe the diversity
and comparative advantages of various empirical approaches that have
been taken by scholars in the health law field to address issues as wideranging as medical malpractice reform and motor safety laws.68 And on
the use of randomized controlled trials, for which these two scholars are
less optimistic, Pleasence provides an account of such an undertaking in
the United Kingdom, highlights the many technical, practical and ethical
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barriers that were faced, and suggests ways to overcome them in the
future.69

V.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR MOVING FORWARD

Deliberate and concerted efforts, however, will be necessary—
among both individual evaluators and others that must support them—to
overcome the numerous barriers to empirical impact evaluations of
health-related adjudicative tribunals. The analysis of challenges described
above point to several strategies that can be pursued.
At the individual level, potential evaluators of adjudicative
tribunals may need to assemble interdisciplinary teams to obtain the
necessary methodological expertise, bring an aura of independence and
credibility to the work, and save tribunal staff from the potentially
uncomfortable situation of relinquishing their perceived independence by
evaluating their own performance. Like the process for assessing the
effectiveness of complex clinical interventions, evaluators of adjudicative
tribunals may then be advised to conceptually map out the way in which
their tribunal functions, its interactions and relationships with others in the
health and legal systems, and its potential effects on each of them.70 This
will aid in focusing the inquiry, identifying areas in which little is known,
generating suitable research questions and determining the appropriate
methodology.
Potential evaluators must also thoughtfully consider both the
target audience of their research and the overall goal that their particular
health-related adjudicative tribunal is expected to help achieve, and then
identify the most important targeted outcomes that are relevant to the
audience and important for the goal’s fulfillment. When such outcomes
cannot directly be measured, as may often be the case, evaluators must
identify strong surrogate endpoints which are measurements that reflect
important outcomes even if they are of indirect or diminished practical
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importance. Performance indicators can then be developed followed by
the corresponding methodologies for tracking changes to them.
In the case of Ontario’s health-related adjudicative tribunals, both
HPARB and HSARB may describe their overall goal as contributing to
the health of Ontarians by enhancing decision-making within the health
system. If government officials are the evaluation’s intended audience,
targeted outcomes could include: (1) confidence in the health system; (2)
equity, justice and fairness in health decision-making; (3) strengthened
health system institutions; and (4) better health services and patient safety
via enhanced regulation and oversight. Since these outcomes would be
nearly impossible to measure directly, surrogate endpoints can be
developed and could possibly include: (1a) access to adjudicative
mechanisms for dispute resolution; (1b) perceived legitimacy of
adjudicative decisions; (2a) satisfaction with adjudicative services; (2b)
perceived fairness and legitimacy of adjudicative services; (3a) interaction
with health system institutions and decision-makers; (3b) existence of
support mechanisms for primary health decision-makers; (3c) effective
oversight of primary health decision-makers; (4a) better decisions by
primary health decision-makers; and (4b) respect for the tribunal’s
oversight function. Performance indicators and their corresponding
empirical methodologies could then range from the public’s awareness for
the tribunal’s existence to the perceived concern among primary health
decision-makers that their decisions will be reversed.
Once a system of empirical observation is in place, potential
evaluators can establish benchmarks according to which they can track
and assess performance. Such comparative points of measurement can be
drawn from thoughtful consideration, aspirational goals of leaders, expert
judgments on what is possible, data from similar tribunals in other
jurisdictions (i.e., comparative analysis), or previous empirical
observations from the same tribunal (i.e., interrupted time-series analysis).
For experimental methods like randomized, controlled trials that are rarer
in socio-legal studies, the control group would serve as the comparative
benchmark rather than any observational data that is external to the
evaluation. Such comparisons are naturally better because they more
accurately represent the counterfactual of what the situation would be like
without the tribunal and can help lead to determinations of causation.
But overcoming the identified challenges and systematizing
empirical impact evaluations of health-related adjudicative tribunals
across time and jurisdictions requires action from stakeholders throughout
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the health and legal systems. For example, scholars in the health law field
must intensify their efforts to build capacity for utilizing empirical
methodologies, enhance the status of such work within legal circles, and
overcome any real or perceived problems with maintaining independence.
Health system institutions should also start to build policy-relevant
databases that are rigorously compiled, comprehensive and publiclyaccessible. Finally, health planners and research funders must facilitate
(or even catalyze) the continuous improvement of adjudicative tribunals
by supporting undertakings to empirically evaluate their impact on
society. Initial funding for small-scale evaluations and/or pilot projects
would be particularly helpful, as would support for disseminating any
lessons learned as widely as possible.
Syntheses of research evidence may be helpful in encouraging
stakeholders to support empirical impact evaluations of health-related
adjudicative tribunals, especially because they are likely to highlight the
current dearth of knowledge in this area. A systematic review on the
effect of adjudicative tribunals in the health sector, for example, would be
a disciplined and rigorous approach to assessing the current state of
research evidence in this area and tracking developments in it over time.71
This tool applies the scientific method to gathering, appraising and
synthesizing what is known (and what is not known) on a particular topic
such that publication and selection bias are limited.72 Such a review has
already been conducted, for example, to assess the impact of drug courts
on criminal recidivism,73 and a protocol has been developed to evaluate
the influence of these specialist courts on narcotics use in particular and
criminal activity more broadly.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, adjudicative tribunals serve an essential function
within the health sector, yet their contributions and impact on the delivery
of health services and society in general are not usually evaluated
empirically. The focus of past tribunal assessments on their internal
operations limit these bodies’ ability to inform continuous quality
improvement efforts, enhance the public’s confidence in them and
maximize their societal impact. Three challenges, however, serve to
complicate empirical impact evaluations of health-related adjudicative
tribunals. First, the complexity of the health system and its countless
independent actors prevents their mechanistic isolation, which is
necessary to elegantly find cause-effect relationships between them and
their goals. Second, the indirect relationship between tribunal services
and their existential purposes—exacerbated by uncertain objectives,
difficulties with randomization and a lack of examples to follow—
presents methodological barriers that cannot be easily overcome. Third,
several realities of the legal profession and the environment in which it
currently operates further hinder evaluation efforts, including its dearth of
empirical capacity, culture of deference to authority, and focus on process
and independence.
There are, however, two main reasons for optimism. Empirical
evaluations of similar judicial bodies have been previously conducted and
there is currently a rapid expansion of interest in empirical health law
scholarship. This analysis of challenges to empirically evaluating the
impact of adjudicative tribunals in the health sector highlights several
potential ways to help move this agenda forward. Individual evaluators,
for example, can assemble interdisciplinary teams, identify their tribunal’s
overall goal, develop surrogate endpoints and conduct a realistic
evaluation that tracks each of them. Stakeholders within the health and
legal systems, on the other hand, can support individual efforts by
earmarking funds for such empirical impact evaluations, building policyrelevant databases and assisting with cross-jurisdictional learning and
dissemination efforts. Syntheses of the research evidence on this topic,
and systematic reviews in particular, may be helpful for highlighting the
absence of knowledge in this area and building support to capitalize on
this otherwise missed opportunity.
Nevertheless, a foundational question remains as to whether it is
even the responsibility of adjudicative tribunals like Ontario’s HPARB
and HSARB to be empirically evaluating their own impact or to help
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others in doing so. Besides the limitations imposed upon them by their
respective statutory mandates, these bodies and others may not
necessarily be concerned about the impact of their decisions and could in
fact be preoccupied with maintaining their independence. Further
consideration must be given to these issues, and others, so that continuous
quality improvement and self-evaluation can become part of tribunals’
core mandates, as otherwise it will be impossible for these bodies to
provide the best services possible to their users, stakeholders and larger
constituency. Any ambitions for self-improvement among health-related
adjudicative tribunals, however, must obviously be balanced with the
legislative, political and social realities within which they operate.

